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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
SVF RIVA ANNAPOLIS, LLC V. GILROY: THE POSSESSION AND 
CONTROL EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF REPOSE IS NOT 
LIMITED TO CASES INVOLVING EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS.   
By: Klara Kim 
     The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that injuries caused by 
improvements to real property are barred by a 20-year statute of limitations 
except for cases involving exposure to asbestos and to any defendants that are 
in possession and control of the property as owner, tenant, or otherwise.  SVF 
Riva Annapolis LLC v. Gilroy, 459 Md. 632, 655, 187 A.3d 686, 700 (2018).  
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the language of Maryland’s statute of 
repose and its structure separated the listed exceptions. Id. In analyzing the 
statutory language, Maryland courts first look to the plain meaning of the 
language in the statute and will only analyze the legislative history if the 
language is ambiguous. Id. at 645-46, 187 A.3d at 694-95.   
     On January 12, 2012, the decedent, Sean McLaughlin (“Mr. McLaughlin”) 
arrived at the Chuck E. Cheese (“CEC”) restaurant located in Festival at Riva 
Shopping Center in Annapolis to repair a HVAC unit located on the rooftop 
of the restaurant. Mr. McLaughlin ascended towards the building’s roof using 
a ladder that was placed on one of the exterior walls of the CEC.  After Mr. 
McLaughlin reached the top, he mounted the wall and fell 20 feet to the 
concrete pad on the other side. Mr. McLaughlin sustained severe injuries and 
died 12 days later.  
     After the death of Mr. McLaughlin, his estate, Moreen Elizabeth Gilroy 
and other survivors (“Gilroy”) filed a wrongful death suit against SVF Riva 
Annapolis, LLC (“SVF”), the owner of the shopping center where Chuck E. 
Cheese was located.  Gilroy’s suit alleged negligence and premises liability, 
arguing SVF was liable in failing to warn McLaughlin that the wall had no 
roof access. SVF moved to have the case dismissed, arguing the statute of 
repose barred Gilroy’s claims since the building had been constructed more 
than 20-years before the accident. 
     The circuit court ruled in favor of the defendants allowing the claims to be 
barred under § 5-108 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”) 
finding that the exceptions to the statutes 20-year limitation were only 
applicable to cases involving asbestos.  Gilroy, 459 Md. at 643, 160 A.3d at 
692.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding the 
possession and control exception was not limited to asbestos cases, but to any 
claims in which the defendant had actual possession and control of the 
property. Id. at 638, 187 A.3d at 690.  The Court of Appeals granted writ of
certiorari to address the proper statutory interpretation of § 5-108 CJP. Id.
     The court began its analysis by looking at the plain language of the statute.  
Gilroy, 459 Md. at 641, 160 A.3d at 692.  The court stated that the proper 
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interpretation of the statute turned on use of the conjunction “or”.  Id. at 643, 
187 A.3d at 692. When Maryland legislators have used “or,” the meaning is 
commonly disjunctive and the two bodies of text are taken independently. Id.
     The court continued its analysis by considering the different approaches 
taken by Maryland courts in handling cases involving CJP § 5-108. Gilroy,
459 Md. at 644, 160 A.3d at 694.  The court acknowledged that Maryland 
courts had not yet analyzed the possession and control exception outside the 
context of asbestos-related claims.  Gilroy, 459 Md. at 644, 160 A.3d at 693-
94 (citing Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351, 643 A.2d 906 (1994); 
Hagerstown Elderly Assoc. Ltd P’ship v. Hagerstown Elderly Bldg. Assocs. 
Ltd. P’ship, 368 Md. 351, 793 A.2d 579 (2002).  Nonetheless, the court 
emphasized that the possession and control exception was independent from 
the asbestos exceptions.  Id.  The court stated that the proximity of the three 
asbestos exceptions should not limit the applicability of the possession and 
control exception to asbestos related claims. Id. at 645, 187 A.3d at 694. 
     Subsequently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found that the broad 
protection offered in §5-108(a) protected all classes of defendants unless they 
were recognized by one of the four exceptions. Gilroy, 459 Md. at 644, 160 
A.3d at 693. The court noted that the named defendants had control and 
possession of the real property, and therefore, the 20-year limitation imposed 
by the statute of repose did not apply to bar Gilroy’s claims.  Id. at 644, 187 
A.3d at 693-94.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed the lower court’s 
decision and agreed that the possession and control exception to the 20-year 
statute of repose was not limited to asbestos cases, and was applicable to any 
defendant in actual control or possession of the property.  Id. at 639-40, 187 
A.3d at 691.   
     Finally, the Court of Appeals of Maryland assessed both the Petitioner’s 
and Respondent’s reliance on the legislative history of § 5-108.  The court 
began its analysis by looking at the original legislative body and the 
subsequent amendments that passed through the Legislature.  Gilroy, 459 Md. 
at 649, 160 A.3d at 696.  First, the court pinpointed that the original statue of 
1970 did not include any mention of asbestos, but had a possession and control 
exception.  Id.  Looking at the amendments made in 1973, 1979, and 1980, the 
possession and control exception to the statute was present; however, the 
legislators had not yet adopted the asbestos exceptions. Id. at 649, 187 A.3d at 
697.  Finally, the court looked at the final amendment passed in 1991, which 
first introduced the three asbestos exceptions. Id.  The court explained that the 
policy behind the “asbestos amendments” was to allow plaintiffs to seek relief 
for latent injuries related to asbestos exposure beyond the 20-year limitation 
imposed by the statute of repose. Id.  The court finally stated that there was no 
support in the legislative history linking the asbestos exceptions to the 
possession and control exception. Id. at 652-53, 187 A.3d at 698-99.   
     In Gilroy, the Court of Appeals of Maryland applied statutory analysis to 
hold that the four exceptions to the statute of repose were not limited to 
asbestos-related claims.  Therefore, the 20-year limitation imposed by the 
statute of repose will not shield defendants that are in possession and control 
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of the property. This decision may result in increased litigation because 
plaintiffs who were injured by a defective or unsafe condition resulting from 
the improvements to real property may have assumed the statute precluded 
their non-asbestos claims.  However, this holding affirms that the possession 
and control exception eliminates the statute’s protection for defendants in 
possession and control of real property.     
